# 1AR---UKRR---R1

## Civil Service

### Civil Service---1AR

#### Civil service outweighs:

#### Governance underpins resilience against food crises, pandemics, environmental disaster, and unforeseen risks. That’s Shulman.

#### Dropped magnitude: extinction is inevitable with weak societal resilience and opaque risks bypass intervening actors because they’re unpredictable.

#### Turns the DA: development collapse and war is inevitable absent governance, but civil servants solve.

### AT: Rant---1AR

#### The Damage has not already been done. Civil servants are commited to their agencies.

#### Workers don’t know about fiat, but they know about collective bargaining.

#### Of course federal workers care about the law, our handler evidence says they value unions and our Bruno and Grant evidence says they act as a “shield” for workers.

#### ‘Firings caused harm’ is aff uniqueness.

#### Yes civil service impact. Trump not listening is answered by our schulmann card. The entire premise is diplomacy from below.

### Diplomacy---1AR

#### Diplomacy solves extinction:

#### It checks nuclear escalation in Ukraine, Taiwan, South Asia, and the Middle East while boosting cooperation on every issue.

#### Solves the DA: diplomacy structurally makes airspace war less likely.

#### It’s not answered by ‘trump is less ecalatory’ because our uniqueness Argument is that diplomacy is straining war now.

### Disease---1AR

#### Concede no disease impact, that takes out the development impact to the rates da.

## Presidency

### Trump---1AR

#### Trump causes extinction:

#### [1]. Multilat. He’s uncooperative, preventing coordination of public goods like growth, migration, climate change, and public health. That’s Öniş.

#### [2]. Wars. Aggressive policy forces draw-in, while his rhetoric undermines deterrence and causes spiraling miscalc. That’s Öniş and Shen.

#### Perez being from 2024 is irrelevant because he says that restoring bargaining can overcome the impacts of firings. 1AC Finkin and Handler are also from 2025.

#### Yes our ev is reverse causal. Plan has the courts restrain the unitary executive.

#### Yes impact. First striking Iran disproves a commitment to peace, and our onis evidence is predictive and says he’ll escalate future conflict. Dropped our indict of their 1NC impact defens that it’s from 2024 and lacks qualification

## Shutdown

### Shutdown---1AR

#### Aff turns DA, not other way around. Diplomacy means each war scenario is less likely to escalate.

#### No turns case. Other asnwers it because shutdown won’t happen and it won’t be prolonged

#### IT doesn’t matter for solvency since Trump only has spending authority until the shutdown ends, which isn’t long enough.

#### The second turns case card doesn’t assume unions, which provide job security and prevent layoffs. That’s Handler.

### Aff Solves---1AR

#### The aff solves the terminal.

#### Union strikes were the only reason trump folded on the 2019 shutdown. That’s Wertsch.

#### Our card is ALSO about shutdown, so it does assume their internal link

#### No double bind.

#### Workers do come back because they WANT unions, but they can’t organize to strike since the infrastructure to do so has been made illegal by Trump

#### They WILL strike in the case of shutdown because the government functioning is really bad even if it breaks the law

#### BUT the aff is key to give them the resources and standing to strike

#### NONE of their cards substantiat eperception

#### It’s offense. Shutdown without unions is worse. Only the plan solves.

Joseph A. McCartin 25. Professor of History at Georgetown University. “Will Federal Workers Rediscover Their Militancy?” 4/1/25. https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online\_articles/will-federal-workers-rediscover-their-militancy/.

Ironically, it was a small number of strategically placed air traffic controllers who finally brought the shutdown to an end when they called in sick, causing a ground stop at LaGuardia Airport on the morning of January 25, 2019, which led the Trump administration to fold by that afternoon. The union that represented those workers, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association—PATCO’s successor—utterly disavowed any responsibility for their action. I had found out a week before that episode just how afraid NATCA was of any suggestion that its members might stage a job action. When I mused in the American Prospect that a controllers’ sickout would end the shutdown in short order, one NATCA official furiously criticized me for even having uttered that thought in public.

In each of these instances, the seeming stability of the federal system of labor relations and federal unions’ deep investment in preserving that system functioned to contain conflicts that otherwise might have spiraled. Now that system is all but destroyed. After mere months in office, Trump has systematically subverted a robust structure that took decades to build. He fired FLRA chair Susan Tsui Grundmann and MSPB chair Cathy Harris, ensuring that henceforth those adjudicating agencies will do his bidding. He effectively shuttered agencies like USAID and turned whole categories of workers—such as those engaged in DEI work—into at-will employees to be fired without due process. And now he has apparently delivered his coup de grâce, demolishing the union rights federal workers have enjoyed for decades.

What Next?

While the Trump order threatens to produce a veritable nuclear winter in U.S. labor relations, its very radicalism makes its long-term impact more unpredictable. The past is full of cautionary tales reminding us that the more an ambitious actor tries to bend history to their will, the more likely the unintended consequences of their actions will undo their grand plans.

One unintended consequence of Trump’s move is that it could very well rouse the union movement and its allies to a more confrontational opposition to his agenda than anyone could have foreseen. Up to this point, federal unions have confined their resistance to filing lawsuits and contract grievances, circulating petitions, holding rallies, and lobbying legislators. Unions have not contemplated job actions to date in large part because they are forbidden by law; engaging in them could lead workers to lose their jobs and cost unions their certifications as bargaining agents, as happened in the PATCO case. But will calculations change in a world where workers no longer feel protected by civil service regulations and their unions have already been decertified for all intents and purposes?

As the sociologist C. Wright Mills observed long ago, where they are firmly established unions tend to act as “managers of discontent.” They seek to direct their members’ grievances into channels that might produce significant—if usually incremental—gains, and to restrain their members from actions that might threaten the union’s survival or damage its credibility as a reliable negotiating partner in the eyes of management. Yet what happens to workers’ discontent when unions are no longer able to play that role? And what happens to union behavior when the system in which they have invested and from which they derived their own stability is shattered?

Up to this point, most federal workers have operated as though the old assumptions still hold true, believing that the terms and conditions under which they work cannot be revoked by one man’s politically motivated order. Most federal unions believed that a presidential fiat could not override the protections they had under the CSRA as long as their organizations abided by its rules.

As the old order crumbles, however, faith in the courts’ ability or willingness to stand up to Trump’s aggression is waning. On the day after he announced his union-busting executive order, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled 2–1 that Trump had the authority to fire Cathy Harris of the MSPB and Gwynne Wilcox of the National Labor Relations Board in the middle of their Senate-confirmed terms. In his concurring opinion, Judge Justin Walker, a Trump appointee, argued that the Constitution’s framers vested in the president “full responsibility for the executive power.” It seems likely that a majority of justices on the current Supreme Court will arrive at the same conclusion when Trump’s wholesale restructuring of federal labor relations reaches their docket—unless something changes the present dynamic.

Can unions bring about that change? The day after Trump’s order was announced, the AFL-CIO acknowledged the existential threat it posed. “No union contract is safe after last night,” it said. Yet whether unions feel incentivized to resist Trump’s attack with more than rhetoric, lobbying, and redoubled lawsuits is an open question. Union leaders realize that the sudden conversion of federal workers to what is effectively at-will employment status and the simultaneous termination of their bargaining rights merely puts them in the same position as the vast majority of private-sector workers, who lack both union representation and employment security. Could the public be stirred to support government workers in a confrontation with the Trump administration? Uncertain of the answer, union leaders are likely to continue to take a cautious approach to this crisis—at least in the near term. Yet even if union leaders do not seek it, an escalating confrontation is more likely now than it has been in generations.

It is worth remembering that federal labor relations were not always as pacific as they have been in recent decades. One reason that Kennedy signed his 1962 executive order was to head off growing unrest among federal employees. Although it has long been illegal for federal workers to engage in strikes, such actions were not uncommon during the years when the system of federal labor relations was under construction. (Between 1956 and 1961, there were ninety-two work stoppages at Cape Canaveral, where America’s space program was based.) Nor did the Kennedy and Nixon executive orders eliminate such activity. Between 1962 and 1981 federal workers engaged in thirty-nine illegal work stoppages.

Unrest among federal workers peaked in March 1970—after the executive orders were promulgated. In that month, hundreds of thousands of postal workers defied the federal ban on striking and staged an eight-day wildcat walkout, frustrated by their inability to negotiate over pay under the government’s limited form of collective bargaining. When Nixon called out the National Guard to deliver the mail, postal workers held firm and only returned to work after they were promised a wage increase. Just as they returned to work, several thousand air traffic controllers staged a seventeen-day sickout to protest the Federal Aviation Administration’s refusal to negotiate with their union. Both job actions produced results. The walkout made it possible for postal workers to win the creation of the U.S. Postal Service, a semi-autonomous federal agency that was allowed to bargain with them over their pay. For their part, air traffic controllers were able to speed up the official recognition of PATCO as their exclusive bargaining agent. It was only after PATCO’s ill-fated 1981 strike that job actions by federal workers became exceedingly rare.

Trump’s radical executive order could reawaken this long-dormant tradition of collective action among otherwise seemingly docile federal workers. Such actions, should they arise, will likely not take the form of a strike. There is a long history of slowdowns, sickouts, and work-to-rule actions by federal workers. Such actions are often difficult for the government to detect, let alone defuse. And they do not require official union sanction. Indeed, like the postal workers’ 1970 wildcat strike, these activities tend to be more effective and harder to defeat when they are unofficial.

#### Worker militancy forces the government to re-open.

Ben Beckett & Ryan Haney 19. Bachelor of Arts at the University of Michigan. Reporter and editor. \*\*Regional truck driver manager who deals with unions. January 2, 2019, “How Federal Workers Could Fight the Shutdown,” Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2019/01/federal-workers-government-shutdown-union-power

But a more militant labor movement could respond to the shutdown very differently, seizing the “choke points” within the US economy and society that federal workers are strategically positioned to take advantage of.

For example, what if Transportation Security Administration workers decided to refuse orders to work without pay, leaving the airport security gates unstaffed during the busiest season for travel? The airlines would be effectively shut down by a TSA agent “wildcat,” with passengers reluctant to board unsecured flights.

Meanwhile, there’s a potential army of 400,000 furloughed federal workers, not just in D.C. but based at government offices across the country. What if, taking a note from the yellow vests movement in France, these workers established “picket lines” blocking major roads and highways, halting all nonemergency traffic? Certainly that traffic would also include package delivery trucks and tractor trailers hauling goods for their own high-demand peak season, many of them driven by Teamsters who are contractually protected when they refuse to cross picket lines.

Imagine the political fallout of this massive economic disruption, all because Trump wants a border wall. Even the MAGA hat-wearers would likely prefer a safe flight home and their packages delivered on time over a wall that they will never even see. The reopening of the government under these conditions would be a massive victory of the labor movement, a product of our own collective efforts rather than that of closed-door negotiations between legislators and the White House.

#### Labor ended the 2019 shutdown. They could do it again, but only with the aff.

SW 19. Socialist Worker. "Will labor learn the lessons of the shutdown?." SocialistWorker.org. 2-4-2019. https://socialistworker.org/2019/02/04/will-labor-learn-the-lessons-of-the-shutdown

IN THE end, it was labor that killed the shutdown.

As Socialist Worker wrote in an editorial, “[I]t took federal workers beginning to snarl traffic at major U.S. airports before [Trump] and the Republicans, without really admitting it, backed down and allowed the federal government to be reopened.”

However, in his January 25 Rose Garden surrender, Trump spent only two minutes announcing the end of the shutdown, and the next 15 minutes ranting about the need for a border wall or “barrier.” In that tirade, Trump threatened federal workers with another government shutdown on February 15, if Congress doesn’t vote for $5.7 billion in funding for his racist border wall.

In the face of this renewed threat, federal workers, federal unions and the labor movement should take a moment to reassess our strategies for resisting the shutdown. We need to ask — and answer — some vital questions.

IF AVIATION workers stopped the shutdown with a “sick-out,” could we have stopped the shutdown sooner?

YES, WE could have. The combined power of federal workers withholding their labor and private-sector workers calling for a safety strike brought Trump to his knees after 35 days, and there is no doubt that with better organization, we could have done so sooner.

As was widely reported, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) airport security screeners, members of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), were among the 420,000 federal workers required to work for those 35 days without getting paid.

The low-paid screeners, many living paycheck to paycheck, quickly ran out of funds to even buy gas or pay train fare to get to work, and began calling out sick in increasing numbers. On some days over the five-week shutdown, TSA agent absences ran up to 10 percent.

On top of delays, flying became less safe, with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) furloughing 4,000 safety inspectors, represented by the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists union, during the first three weeks of the lockout.

Airline passenger and crew safety concerns led Association of Flight Attendants International President Sara Nelson to call for the labor movement “to end this shutdown with a general strike,” as she accepted the 2019 AFL-CIO MLK Drum Major for Justice Award.

Then, on Friday morning, January 25, air traffic controller absences at FAA facilities in Washington, D.C., and Jacksonville, Florida, caused a ground stop at New York’s LaGuardia Airport and delays up and down the East Coast. Air traffic controllers have been represented by National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) since 1987.

Within hours on Friday, the shutdown — and the lockout of federal employees — was over.

Given the combined power of public-sector and private-sector aviation workers that seems to have come together without coordination, imagine how much sooner we could have stopped the shutdown if we had organized together.

#### Failure to organize emboldens shutdown brinkmanship. That means the plan stops future shutdowns.

Ben Beckett 19. "Sickouts and Strike Threats Stopped the Government Shutdown." Jacobin. 1-25-2019. https://jacobin.com/2019/01/government-shutdown-collective-action-strikes-unions

Many federal workers will understandably want to simply return to work and put the lockout behind them. But the shutdown and the way it ended show that it is critical for federal workers to keep organizing.

The fact that the lockout was able to go on so long without an effective response will embolden the Republicans to use the tactic again. In fact, Trump’s proposal only funds the government through February 15, at which point the whole thing could start over if no permanent agreement is reached. And while legislation to provide back pay to government subcontractors — many of whom are low-wage workers — has been proposed, the deal as it stands does not provide for them.

But the speed with which Trump folded when faced with a serious disruption to business as usual at workers’ initiative shows how much power federal workers have — if they come together and figure out how to use it.

#### Litigation blocks and deters the government.

Zachary R. Henige 19. Attorney, Kalijarvi, Chuzi, Newman & Fitch, P.C. "Holding the Trump Administration Accountable for Paying Workers during Government Shutdown." American Constitution Society. 1-9-2019. https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/holding-the-trump-administration-accountable-for-paying-workers-during-government-shutdown/

The federal government has been shut down for more than two weeks, and just last Friday, President Donald Trump declared that he could keep parts of the government shut down for “months or even years.” Federal workers and many contractors are not getting paid during the shutdown, even those who are deemed essential and forced to work. To hold the government accountable for paying workers, the union representing government employees is suing the federal government.

Federal law requires that the government pay employees in full and on time

The ongoing government shutdown is unconscionable, leaving hundreds of thousands of dedicated public servants and contract employees wondering when theywill get their next paychecks. As the shutdown continues, many people will be forced to forego medical treatment, miss a rent payment, or wonder whether they can afford groceries.

In 1938, Congress found this kind of problem to be unacceptable, and to protect workers, it passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which governs minimum wage and overtime compensation. In 1974, Congress specifically extended the reach of the FLSA to federal employees. In the following years, courts have unanimously held that the FLSA requires that employees be paid in full and on time. When an employer schedules a regular payday, it must honor that payday.

To remind employers that they will be responsible if they fail to pay wages on time, workers may recover not only the amount of their unpaid wages, but they also are entitled to “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages” to compensate them for the harm caused when their payments are delayed. As the government has taken no steps, legally or otherwise, to ensure its employees are timely paid, it is engaging in a bad faith violation of the FLSA, which requires employers, including the government, to pay covered employees at least minimum wage and overtime on the correct payday.

Sadly, this is not new to the government. Following the October 2013 shutdown, approximately 25,000 essential federal employees, represented by Heidi Burakiewicz, now a partner at Kalijarvi Chuzi Newman and Fitch (“KCNF”), sued the government for failing to pay them on their regularly scheduled pay date. In July 2014, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the government violated the FLSA when it failed to pay on their regularly scheduled payday the employees who worked during the shutdown, and in February 2017, the Court ruled even further that the government was liable for liquidated damages because it did not act in good faith. The government is currently calculating the damages it will have to pay to those employees.

### Courts Shield---1AR

#### Courts avoid the link:

#### They’re a shield that cushions the blow of unpopular policies, allowing politicians to dodge the heat. Prefer Craig: they cite a consensus of studies. It cites other recent data points, and they don t have a single card!

#### Courts shield the floor time link better since they don’t require any legislative time!

#### Colling is wrong: courts act as cover.

Gerald S. Dickinson 25. Professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, J.D. from the Fordham University School of Law. "Judicial Laboratories." *Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law*, 27.75, 147-148.

Other scholars take a more aggressive view of state courts in school finance reform.

<Footnote begins>

See, e.g., Thro, supra note 484, at 223 (discussing how state courts declared respective school finance systems unconstitutional, prompting legislative responses and effectively compelling political action.); see generally MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE COURTS (2009) (arguing that state courts help legislatures increase school funding by issuing rulings that shield them from political backlash).

<Footnote ends>

This viewpoint sees state courts serving as democratic "cover" for timid legislatures that want to increase funding for school finance, but are politically reticent to test the waters due to the specter of raising taxes on constituents. These policy-driven remedial mandates may require state courts to impose affirmative obligations on the legislatures to correct funding failures by shaping the nature of educational opportunities. In other words, it appears that scholars supporting such judicial intervention envision not only a rights-based role of state courts over constitutional protections, but also a role that is primarily focused on imposing policy-directive remedial orders mandating specific educational services. Such judicial determinations and actions suggest that school finance experiments fit neatly within judicial laboratories of democracy. And there are, indeed, examples of elected judiciaries taking a prominent policymaking role from the bench to correct democratic failures in school financing. But those experiments into the democratic arena of education have vacillated from cautious to aggressive.

#### Counter-interp: affs use any agent. Their interp ruins durable fiat since affs lose to courts overturn and greenlights process trash like the PQD counterplan. Dropped from ASPEC that agent counterplans are unfair and kill aff ground.

#### Functional limits like states and employment law solves aff quantity.

#### ‘Collective bargaining rights’ are agent agnostic.

John Lund & Cheryl Maranto 96. M.A. Candidate at Marian College. Associate Professor at Marquette University. “Public Sector Labor Law: An Update.” 1-1-1996. Management Faculty Research and Publications. https://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1103&context=mgmt\_fac

This chapter begins with a review of significant state legislative changes as well as selected court decisions, executive orders, and attorney general opinions since 1987 which affected collective bargaining rights in the public sector. We then summarize current legal provisions (the duty to bargain, terminal resolution procedures, and strike penalties) by state and sector (police and fire, state workers, etc.). Finally, we review and analyze two key post-1987 trends: (1) legislative and constitutionallimitations on the finality of collective bargaining agreements or interest arbitration awards and (2) procedures for handling nonmember objections to agency shop fees in light of Hudson, 475 US 292, 121 LRRM 2793 (1986) and Lehnert, III S.Ct 1950, 137 LRRM 2321 (1991).

Major Changes since 1987

Major State Legislative Changes

The seven-year period from 1987 to 1994 witnessed a relatively low level of legislative activity with only 11 states enacting laws. 1 Only one state (New Mexico) passed a comprehensive law granting bargaining rights to public employees where no previous bargaining law existed. Nebraska's new law extends bargaining rights to state workers, and Texas law gives localities the option of providing bargaining rights to police and firefighters. The remaining eight states amended existing bargaining laws at the margins, and most (six) of these covered educational employees only.

Given the low level and limited nature of changes in state collective bargaining legislation, it might be tempting to conclude that the legal framework in the public sector is quite stable. However, as Hebdon (this volume) points out, this apparent stability is largely an artifact of the fragmented structure of public sector bargaining law. Our later discussion of limitations on the finality of collective bargaining agreements and "binding" arbitration awards through judicial decisions and fiscal control measures demonstrates that a great deal of flux exists beneath the stable veneer.

Table 1 summarizes these laws. Changes in administrative regulations and proposed legislation are not included. Significant court decisions interpreting existing law or regulations, executive orders, and attorney ... general opinions are reported later.

Significant Court Decisions Affecting Bargaining Rights

Since it is not possible to report all significant court decisions here, priority is given to decisions which affected the duty to bargain, terminal resolution steps, the right to strike, and the finality of collective bargaining agreements and arbitration awards. Thirteen significant state court decisions regarding public sector bargaining are reported in Table 2. Five concern the finality of ratified collective bargaining agreements or interest arbitration awards. These are discussed at some length in a separate section on the finality issue. Three decisions relate to the legal status of public employee strikes and are discussed in the summary of current state law provisions. Finally, two decisions concern the legal status of interest arbitration, and the remaining three deal with miscellaneous issues.

#### ‘United States federal government’ is any of its bodies.

Chicago ’13 [Chicago Manual of Style; carbon dated June 23, 2013; Questions and Answers, “Headlines and Titles of Works?” https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/qanda/data/faq/topics/CapitalizationTitles/faq0015.html]

A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

**‘Resolved’ means introducing a resolution.**

Merriam-Webster 7, carbon dated 1/7/2007, “resolve verb,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved

3a: to declare or decide by a formal resolution and vote

b: to change by resolution or formal vote

// the house resolved itself into a committee

## Rates

### 1AR---AT: Development Impact

#### The impact to ‘development is completely made up. The 2NC just says ‘Disease, civil wars, and inequality’, but none of those can be terminal. Conceded disease defense on the case. ‘Civil wars’ are not extinction because no developing countries have nukes. Inequality is thumped by

#### The plan solves the impact. USAID is the greatest force for development in history. Knickmeyer card says it dooms “billions’ in projects that sustain developing econopmies.

#### The 2NC just said ‘case dfefense wll answer’ which is wrong.

#### Overturning the XO reauthorizes USAID.

Rebecca Beitsch 25. Staff writer for the Hill. With Nathaniel Weixel. "Trump administration moves to eliminate USAID, firing remaining employees." Hill. 3-28-2025. https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/5220447-trump-administration-to-end-usaid/

In a separate move late Thursday, President Trump signed an executive order directing a number of agencies to suspend union bargain rights. Included on the list was USAID as the administration classified it as a national security agency.

The Trump administration has characterized USAID as an agency rife with fraud and worked to quickly dismantle it in his first few weeks in office. Thousands of employees have already been fired or placed on indefinite administrative leave.

Trump also sought to freeze almost all foreign assistance programs pending an administrative review, including lifesaving health and medical assistance.

Staff and supporters of the agency, however, contend that while it may have needed some reforms, it served a critical function.

It provided food assistance and medical care, while also investing in education and economic programs to stabilize countries, reduce migration and combat the influence of terrorist organizations.

#### Or, it’s a huge alt caus that makers collapse inevitable.

#### Rates are not key. 2AC evidence cites the world bank and says that growth was slow even under favorable rates AND that

### BLS Turn---1AR

#### Trump gutting the BLS makes economic miscalibration inevitable:

#### Stats are the foundation of private investment and monetary policy. Loss of trust causes uncertainty and hampers effective economic decision-making, but the aff solves through allowing bureaucrats to do their job without fear of retaliation. That’s Krueger.

#### Turns impact.

#### The answer to this doesn’t make sense. Even if it doesn’t matter for the next set of cuts, our ev says that no data means rate cuts are INEVITABLE and powell mis calibrates eventually.

#### Slow growth and rate hikes are inevitable absent the civil service.

Michael Strain 25. Director of Economic Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Ph.D. in economics from Cornell University. "Trump Must Appoint a Nonpartisan Statistics Chief." Project Syndicate. 8/6/2025. project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-must-not-install-lackey-as-bureau-labor-statistics-commissioner-by-michael-r-strain-2025-08

By incorrectly asserting that the jobs data are biased, Trump is undermining the credibility of the information on which policymakers, businesses, households, and investors depend. The economic implications are far-reaching. Without a good sense of the economic facts on the ground, investors may perceive risk levels to be higher, businesses might delay new projects, and the US Federal Reserve could make a costly mistake in setting interest rates.

Trump’s decision to fire McEntarfer and appoint a new BLS commissioner has a historical resonance that is hard to ignore. The Soviet Union and China regularly falsified economic data to buttress their policies. (Joseph Stalin executed the census official who found that the Soviet Union had a smaller population than Stalin had announced).

It cannot be stated often enough that the data produced by the BLS about the labor market – and US government economic data more broadly – are the gold standard. There is simply no substitute for it. While private-sector data are an important compliment to official statistics, they are often benchmarked against government data and are not nearly as representative nor as authoritative.

Likewise, revisions to official statistics – the trigger for McEntarfer’s firing – are routine and not a cause for concern. Government agencies must balance the need for high-quality data with the imperative of timely reporting.

The jobs figures are an estimate of the total number of payroll employees during the week that includes the 12th day of the month. Companies are surveyed, but some send in their responses late, while others pay their workers monthly, at the end of the month. The challenge for the BLS is to provide decision-makers with vital information as quickly as it can, while knowing that the longer it waits, the higher the quality of its data will be.

For example, the BLS could have waited until August to report data for May, but that would have made it hard for the Federal Reserve to set interest rates over the summer and for businesses to make important decisions that rely on the state of the labor market. So, instead, BLS releases an estimate for May in June, and then another based on more complete data in July, before it reports a final figure in August.

In addition to survey response issues, the BLS must contend with the challenge of estimating the reduction in employment from firms that exited the market in May, and the number of net new jobs in firms that were created in May. It must also account for seasonal fluctuations in employment.

The upshot is that revisions are just that – revisions, not corrections.

Moreover, while last week’s revisions were large, with May’s employment total revised down by 125,000 jobs and June’s by 133,000 jobs, they did not strike me as worrisome or excessive. According to my calculations, over the past three decades there were ten instances of downward revisions larger than 100,000 jobs and 26 instances of upward revisions of more than 100,000 jobs.

Trump should think twice before attempting to install a lackey at the BLS. He would be wise to remember that when Argentina manipulated its inflation data – and markets stopped trusting official statistics – interest rates increased and the country’s debt crisis worsened.

Still, even if Trump installs a yes-man as commissioner, we should continue to believe in the integrity of the data – which are extremely hard to rig – until the agency’s civil servants give us reason not to.

McEntarfer made decisions at the BLS free from political influence. The agency’s next leader should be just as independent. If not, policymakers, business leaders, households, and investors may begin to perceive government data as flawed, which can have damaging and cascading effects throughout the US economy. It is in Trump’s direct political interest to avoid this. But given his history of scoring own goals, I am worried.

### Inflation Link---1AR

#### No inflation link:

#### a) Scope. The aff only covers one million workers.

#### b) Thumpers. Public sector unions existed for 65 years before Trump. Prefer empirics over speculative warrants that are divorced from reality.

#### c) Legal barriers. They can’t even negotiate for higher wages or strike.

#### That’s Hsu.

#### They don’t have a single card that says Powell cares about public sector unions

#### Winning link defense beats perception because they agree Powell is smart and they know the plan won’t increase rates

#### State and local employees thump.

Everett Kelley 22. National president of the AFGE. "Everything you thought you knew about federal workers' pay is wrong." The Hill. 9/28/2022. thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3665929-everything-you-thought-you-knew-about-federal-workers-pay-is-wrong

The truth is that multiple credible studies show federal employees are woefully underpaid relative to what they could earn in the private sector for similar work.

According to the most recent pay surveys from the Labor Department, federal workers’ base pay is 52 percent less than similar private sector workers. Locality payments, which vary by location and are paid on top of base salaries, have helped to shrink the pay gap incrementally since they were introduced in the early 1990s. Yet even after factoring in these locality payments, federal employees still earn about 22.5% percent less today than employees outside the federal government doing similar jobs.

To put that into perspective: For every dollar earned by a correctional officer at a state or local prison, that same officer would receive 77.5 cents working at the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

And since that’s an average, there are many instances where the salary gap is even larger – especially in big cities where federal salaries are much lower compared to what employers in state and local governments and the private sector pay for the same jobs.

So how did we get to a situation where a federal correctional officer who oversees some of the most dangerous criminals in the nation is paid hardly more than three quarters as much as an officer at a state or local prison down the street? Politicians repeated the falsehood about federal pay so many times, Congress refused to give workers a substantial pay increase for years based on a total fabrication.

Over the past 15 years, the annual base pay raise for federal employees has averaged just 1.3% and bumps up to just 1.7 percent with locality pay factored in – and that includes three years where employees received no pay raise at all.

#### Wage growth is hard to come by and lags the private sector.

Mike Maciag 22. Officer with the Pew Charitable Trusts' state fiscal health initiative, M.B.A. from the Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management. "Goverment Wage Growth Lags Private Sector by Largest Margin on Record." Pew. 2/7/2022. pew.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2022/02/07/government-wage-growth-lags-private-sector-by-largest-margin-on-record

Nationally, pay increases for state and local government employees haven’t kept pace with those of private workers, who generally have enjoyed much stronger gains as the economy recovers. A Pew analysis of Labor Department data shows that the year-over-year growth rate for hourly private sector salary and wages in each of the past four quarters has exceeded that for state and local governments by the largest margin on record. To make matters worse, public employee wages aren’t keeping pace with high inflation. Concerns over pay have compounded an already difficult situation for governments in recruiting and retaining staff and put additional strains on public services.

Some states, cities, and school districts have started confronting these growing wage pressures, but the public sector generally has been much slower than private companies to implement changes. Government pay raise proposals are often subject to lengthy approval or union negotiation processes, or they require authorization from elected officials. Many jurisdictions either don’t have enough fiscal wiggle room or are hesitant to commit to the recurring costs of permanent pay raises. How they respond has important long-term implications for their budgets, potentially causing challenges if revenue fails to keep up with new spending commitments.

Private sector wage growth already slightly exceeded that of state and local government before the pandemic. Last year, however, differences in year-over-year growth rates more than doubled to the highest levels in nearly four decades in the wages and salaries component of the Labor Department’s Employment Cost Index, which measures changes in labor costs per hour worked. In 2021’s fourth quarter, private sector wages were up 5% over the year, compared with 2.7% for state and local governments, not accounting for inflation. This represents a reversal from the Great Recession, when public employee wages initially held up better.

### --AT: Smith---1AR

#### Smith is in the context of Illinois and about strikes and bargaining over pay, which is illegal for federal workers.

Mailee Smith 25, Senior Director of Labor Policy and Staff Attorney at Illinois Policy, J.D. from the Valparaiso University School of Law, “How government unions work against interests of private-sector unions, taxpayers,” Illinois Policy, 01-08-2025, accessed 09-08-2025, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/how-government-unions-work-against-interests-of-private-sector-unions-taxpayers, DG

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Illinois Policy

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If early union activists thought government unions are so different, what are those differences?

First, there is no archetypal profit motive in the government sector. Congress passed laws promoting collective bargaining in the private sector to prevent the exploitation of workers by employers who were seeking to increase their profits through long work hours and poor working conditions. For example, the United Mine Workers of America was founded to bring coal miners out of horrible conditions and unregulated mines.11 In 1898, before Congress had even passed modern labor laws, that union secured its first contract, which guaranteed wage increases and an eight-hour day, among other provisions.12

That protection is inapplicable to government workers. Because the purpose of government is not to generate a higher profit, it therefore lacks the same incentive to exploit workers.13 Moreover, most government jobs are not dangerous, nor do they exist under horrible conditions. In fact, most union members in the United States are now professionals.14

Second, there is a natural check on union demands in the private sector. Private-sector union demands are limited by the company’s profit capacity and other competition in the marketplace. If a private-sector union demands too much, a company will eventually crumble or lose market share to less expensive competitors, and union workers will lose their jobs.

One example: Striking bakery workers drove iconic Hostess Brands Inc., out of business in 2012, triggering the closure of the company’s 33 bakeries, 565 distribution centers and 570 outlet stores.15 Then-CEO Gregory Rayburn explained the company simply did not have the financial resources to weather an extended nationwide strike. The closure affected 18,500 workers.16

There is no similar check in the public sector. Governments don’t permanently shut down or immediately go bankrupt because unions demand more money. Instead, taxes go up and taxpayers bear the burden.

Third, there is no competition in the public sector. The public sector is a monopoly. There is one source for government services. If a resident is displeased with the services her state provides, she cannot simply choose to seek those services elsewhere – barring a move to another state. If she is displeased with the operations of her local city government, she cannot choose to receive those services from the next town over without moving. The private sector, on the other hand, is competitive. If a consumer is unhappy with a service provided by a private business, he or she can shop elsewhere.

The monopolistic setup is compounded when government workers decide to strike. Strikes or other work stoppages by government workers can cripple state and local governments and shut down important public operations and services. This has an obvious detrimental impact on residents.

And that ties into the final, though perhaps most important, distinction: the very nature of government unions pits them against the taxpayers. In the private sector, increased union salaries and benefits are reflected in the services a company provides. Costs go up and are passed on to the consumers, or the employer eats the costs and earns less profit, or a combination of the two. If costs go up, consumers can decide to do business elsewhere. Unions are bargaining against the employer, not against the consumer.

In the public sector, unions are bargaining against the taxpayers. When government unions bargain for higher wages and greater benefits, they are demanding that taxpayers pay more or prioritize money away from other services. That, in turn, makes the demands of government unions inherently political. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, “decision making by a public employer is above all a political process.”17

What’s more, unions often pour millions into the political campaigns of the officials they are bargaining “against” at the negotiating table.18 Government unions, in essence, hire their own employers. Instead of fair and balanced bargaining, where a government employer is representing the interests of taxpayers, he or she is beholden to the union on the other side of the table. Taxpayers and their interests are not truly represented.19 It is very different from the private sector, in which there is a distinct differentiation between employer and union.

Warnings from early union activists went unheeded by politicians. In the 1960s, states began enacting laws allowing and regulating collective bargaining for government unions.20 By 1970, about half of state workers across the nation had gained collective bargaining privileges.21

Illinois followed in 1983.22 It’s now a state that proves those early activists correct.

### --AT: DiSalvo---1AR

#### DiSalvo is too old. He doesn’t assume the fact that Trump obviously does play hardball and is about state unions that can negotiate for pay increases, unlike federal workers.

Daniel DiSalvo 10, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the City College of New York, Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Virginia, “The Trouble with Public Sector Unions,” National Affairs, Fall 2010, accessed 09-08-2025, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-public-sector-unions, DG

By contrast, as economist Richard Freeman has written, "public sector unions can be viewed as *using their political power to raise demand for public services*, as well as using their bargaining power to fight for higher wages." The millions spent by public-employee unions on ballot measures in states like California and Oregon, for instance, almost always support the options that would lead to higher taxes and more government spending. The California Teachers Association, for example, spent $57 million in 2005 to defeat referenda that would have reduced union power and checked government growth. And the political influence of such massive spending is of course only amplified by the get-out-the-vote efforts of the unions and their members. This power of government-workers' unions to increase (and then sustain) levels of employment through the political process helps explain why, for instance, the city of Buffalo, New York, had the same number of public workers in 2006 as it did in 1950 — despite having lost half of its population (and thus a significant amount of the demand for public services).

**<Their Card Begins>**

A further important advantage that public-sector unions have over their private-sector counterparts is their relative freedom from market forces. In the private sector, the wage demands of union workers cannot exceed a certain threshold: If they do, they can render their employers uncompetitive, threatening workers' long-term job security. In the public sector, though, government is the monopoly provider of many services, eliminating any market pressures that might keep unions' demands in check. Moreover, unlike in the private sector, contract negotiations in the public sector are usually not highly adversarial; most government-agency mangers have little personal stake in such negotiations. Unlike executives accountable to shareholders and corporate boards, government managers generally get paid the same — and have the same likelihood of keeping their jobs — regardless of whether their operations are run efficiently. They therefore rarely play hardball with unions like business owners and managers do; there is little history of "union busting" in government.

Additionally, the rise and fall of businesses in the private sector means that unions must constantly engage in organizing efforts, reaching out to employees of newly created companies. In government agencies, on the other hand, once a union organizes workers, they usually remain organized — because the government doesn't go out of business. Public-employee unions can thus maintain membership levels with much less effort than can private-sector unions.

### --AT: Green---1AR

#### Green is about private sector unions spilling over to non-unionized private sector employees, not the public sector. The aff doesn’t create an “outside option” because federal workers can’t bargain for pay increases.

### --AT: Bur---1AR

#### Bur is about annual pay increases and cites another article.

Bur ’21 [Jessie; September 1; covers federal IT and management; Federal Times, "Answers to federal workers’ questions about government labor unions," https://www.federaltimes.com/management/hr/2021/09/01/answers-to-federal-workers-questions-about-government-labor-unions/]

Federal unions don’t have a direct influence on employee pay and benefit options, though the lobbyists hired through union dues spend much of their time advocating for Congress to pass legislation that benefits government workers, including [annual pay increases](https://www.federaltimes.com/management/pay-benefits/2021/05/28/biden-requests-a-higher-federal-pay-raise-for-2022/) and expansions of benefits like paid parental leave.

#### Which says those pay increases are small and follow inflation instead of causing it.

Jessie Bur 21. Reporter. "Biden requests a higher federal pay raise for 2022." Federal Times. 5/28/2021. federaltimes.com/management/pay-benefits/2021/05/28/biden-requests-a-higher-federal-pay-raise-for-2022

That increase is not quite as high as some legislators proposed at the beginning of the year, which would have included a 3.2 percent increase for feds, but Biden’s proposal does keep the federal pay raise on par with the proposed military increase, which also was set at 2.7 percent.

“While we are supportive that the long tradition of military-civilian pay raise parity has been honored in the president’s proposal, 2.7 percent is simply not nearly enough to compensate for the losses in buying power of federal wages and salaries over the past decade,” American Federation of Government Employees National President Everett Kelley said in a statement.

### AT: Union Spillover---1AR

#### Public unions obviously do not spill over.

Heidi Shierholz et al. 24. President of the Economic Policy Institute, Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan. Celine McNicholas, former special counsel for the NLRB, J.D. from Villanova University School of Law. Margaret Poydock, senior policy analyst at the Economic Policy Institute, B.S. in political communication from Emerson College. Jennifer Sherer, director of the State Worker Power Initiative, Ph.D. in English from the University of Iowa. "Workers want unions, but the latest data point to obstacles in their path." Economic Policy Institute. 1/23/2024. epi.org/publication/union-membership-data

It is important to view this data in context. Union density has consistently declined over the past five decades. There are many factors that contributed to this decline, but at its core the decline reflects an intentional political effort to suppress workers’ wage growth and shift income to profits and executive salaries by stripping away the most important leverage that workers have—the right to bargain collectively (Mishel, Rhinehart, and Windham 2020).

Employer opposition to unions significantly intensified in the 1970s, and employers now routinely exploit weaknesses in U.S. labor law to legally and illegally defeat union organizing. For nearly 50 years, federal policy has failed to respond to this dynamic. Except for an expansion of coverage into health care in the 1970s, all the legislative changes to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which governs private-sector labor law in the U.S., since its enactment in the mid-1930s have been changes that weakened unions. As a result, U.S. policy effectively denies workers a meaningful right to a union and collective bargaining. It is a testament to the commitment to organizing efforts and the enthusiasm of young workers for unions that we saw unionization increase in the private sector by 261,000 in the face of toothless labor policy. Unfortunately, those gains were diminished by the decline in public-sector unionization where the impact of relentless attacks in some states on workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively is being realized.

In this report, we examine the 2023 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on unionization. We analyze the decline in the unionization rate and examine the differences in the private and public sectors. Finally, we offer policy recommendations to promote unionization and build on the momentum we see in increased labor actions.

2023 Bureau of Labor Statistics data: Unionization rate rises in the private sector but declines in the public sector

In 2023, 16.2 million workers in the United States were represented by a union—an increase of 191,000 from 2022. But while the unionization level increased, the share of workers represented by a union—the unionization rate—declined from 11.3% to 11.2%. The unusual situation of the unionization level increasing while the unionization rate decreased is the result of the fact that 2023 saw very strong job growth, with 2.9 million wage and salary jobs added.1 On net, unionization efforts were unable to keep pace with the flood of new jobs.

The overall unionization numbers mask large differences between the private sector and the public sector. Unionization is much lower in the private sector than the public sector—in 2023, 6.9% of private-sector workers were covered by a union contract, compared with 36.0% of public-sector workers. However, the private-sector unionization rate rose in 2023, while the public sector experienced losses.